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Nonliability for Negligence in the Public Schools-
"Educational Malpractice" from Peter W. to Hoffmnan
I. Introduction
On December 17, 1979, the New York Court of Appeals rendered a deci-
sion that could mark a major development in the field of education law. The
court, in Hoffman v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 1 held that a cause of
action sounding in "educational malpractice," although possibly cognizable
under traditional notions of tort law, would not be recognized as a matter of
public policy. The significance of the decision lies in the New York court's ex-
pansive reading of the term "educational malpractice."
In this Note, it will be argued that in Hoffman, the New York Court of Ap-
peals erred in its classification of the facts before it as an "educational malprac-
tice''2 action because Hoffman did not present a claim of educational malprac-
tice in the traditional sense.3 The labeling of the facts in Hoffman as educational
malpractice rewrites the term by significantly expanding its scope. The court
may have set a precedent that will effectively shield educational administration
from judicial inquiry, even when such inquiry would be warranted.
II. The Facts
Daniel Hoffman was born April 6, 1951.4 His mother was a German im-
migrant with the equivalent of a junior high school education. Daniel was 13
months old and just beginning to talk when his father died. After his father's
death, Daniel developed a severe speech impediment. His doctor believed that
this was probably due to the shock of his father's death and that he would get
over it.
Daniel, however, did not overcome his impediment. In February of 1956,
when Daniel was almost five years old and still unable to speak properly, his
mother took him to the National Hospital for Speech Disorders. The hospital's
records noted that Daniel was a "friendly child with little or no intelligible
speech." ' 5 The records also stated that the child had "Mongoloid eyes" and
that the "impression" was "borderline Mongolism." ' 6 One month later,
1 49 N.Y.2d 121, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979).
2 See text accompanying notes 34-83 infra. "Educational malpractice" is a term that prior to Hoffman
referred to an action for negligence, alleging a general failure to educate.
3 Assuming that anything in such a developing area of the law can be called "traditional." The first
case involving the issue did not reach the appellate level until 1976. The term "educational malpractice"
did not appear in a reported decision until 1977.
4 This factual narrative is based upon the majority opinion of the intermediate appellate court, 410
N.Y.S.2d 99, 101-07, and supplemented by Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent, Hoffman v. Board of Education
of the City of New York, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (App. Div. 1978) at 4-31. Special thanks are extended to the firm
of Pazer & Epstein, New York City, counsel for plaintiff-respondent, for its assistance in the preparation of
this Note.
5 410 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
6 Id. This was the beginning of Daniel's problems. One year later, he would again be labeled as having
"Mongoloid features" and "Mongoloid tendencies." Id. As the court pointed out, Mongolism is a
chromosomal abnormality. Being a genetic problem, a person cannot be any more a "borderline
Mongoloid" than a person can be borderline pregnant. Id. at 101 n.1.
Daniel was administered a non-verbal intelligence test by a psychologist
employed by the hospital. On this test, Daniel scored an IQ of ninety-a score
within the range of normal intelligence. 7
Six months later, in September of 1956, Daniel entered kindergarten.
Four months later, Monroe Gottsegen, a clinical scientist who had been
employed by the defendant school board for one week and who had not yet
received his Ph.D. in psychology, administered the primarily verbal Stanford-
Binet Intelligence Test to Daniel. On this test, Daniel scored an IQ of seventy-
four, one point below the statutory cutoff point of seventy-five required for
placement in classes for children with retarded mental development (CRMD).
Despite the borderline determination of IQ and the fact that the Stanford-
Binet Intelligence Test has a standard deviation of fifteen to sixteen8, Gott-
segen recommended placement in the CRMD class. He was not, however,
convinced of his determination. The Stanford-Binet Test is primarily verbal,
and Daniel was afflicted with a severe speech impediment. Gottsegen had ex-
perienced a great deal of difficulty understanding Daniel's verbal responses.
The IQ determination of seventy-four was essentially an approximation based
upon Gottsegen's guesses as to what Daniel was trying to say. In his report,
dated January 23, 1957, Gottsegen states, ". . . [Daniel] needs help with his
speech problem in order that he be able to learn to make himself understood.
Also his intelligence should be reevaluated within a two-year period so that a
more accurate estimate of his abilities may be made. "9
Despite Gottsegen's doubts of the accuracy of his results, no attempt was
made to obtain Daniel's social history. If a social history had been obtained, it
would have revealed that Daniel had been an otherwise normal child until he
developed his speech impediment upon the death of his father. More impor-
tantly, it would have also revealed that Daniel had received a score of ninety on
a nonverbal IQ test only ten months before.
Daniel entered his first CRMD class in October of 1957. When his mother
took him to the class, she was told that it was a class for retarded children and
that her son would not have been placed in the class unless he were, in fact,
mentally retarded. 10 His mother was never informed that the recommendation
for placement of her child in CRMD classes was based upon her son's falling
only one point short of the statutory cutoff of seventy-five. Moreover, she was
never informed that the internal rules of the school administration would have
required a retesting of Daniel upon her request." At the time of Daniel's first
class, Mrs. Hoffman inquired whether her son would receive speech therapy in
the special class and was informed that "he [would) get everything that is
7 410 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
8 L. CRONBACH, ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 216 (3d ed. 1970). This fact was not discussed
in the court decisions. This means that because of the inherent inaccuracies of the Stanford-Binet Test, an
IQ determination of seventy-four could reflect a genuine IQ from sixty-six to eighty-two. This fact should
have been more significant since Daniel's placement in CRMD classes was substantially motivated by his
performance on the Stanford-Binet Test. A proper interpretation of the test result would have been that
Daniel may not even have been eligible for CRMD placement.
9 410 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
10 Id. at 104.
11 Id. at 103.
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needed .... "12 She later stated that she was "happy about that, and that's
how it all started. He was in a retarded class and he stayed there." ' 13
Daniel remained in CRMD classes for eleven years.1 4 At no time during
those eleven years was he given an additional intelligence test as Gottsegen had
originally recommended. In September of 1968, Daniel was transferred from
CRMD classes to a manual and shop training center for retarded youths. At
the start of his second year at the center, he was informed that he was no longer
eligible to remain since it had been determined that he was not retarded.' 5 Four
months earlier, Dr. William F. Garber had administered the Wechsler In-
telligence Scale for Adults test to Daniel, and he had scored a verbal IQ of
eighty-five and a performance IQof 107, for a full-scale IQof ninety-four. This
IQ determination placed Daniel in the normal range of intelligence, despite his
having been "closeted with mentally retarded children for more than twelve
years."1 6 This result was also consistent with the IQ determination made thir-
teen years before by the National Hospital for Speech Disorders. 17
After being dismissed from the training center, Daniel, a boy who did not
know how to do anything except go to school, went into a state of prolonged
depression.' 8 In December of 1969, he was examined by Dr. Lawrence I.
Kaplan, a neurologist and psychiatrist. Dr. Kaplan's opinion was that Daniel
was not mentally retarded, but that he had a "defective self-image and feelings
of inadequacy" caused by being placed in a class of mentally retarded children
and resulting in "an alteration in his concept of himself, particularly because
he is intelligent enough to appreciate the position in which he is placed." 1 9
In January of 1970, Daniel was administered several IQ tests. On the ver-
bal tests, he scored an IQ of eighty-nine. On the performance tests, he scored
an IQ of 114, for a full-scale IQ of 100.20 He scored below average on the test
areas affected by schooling, but above average in areas which required no
previous learning in a school situation. 21 The psychologist who had ad-
ministered the tests concluded that Daniel's learning potential had always been
above average. 22 His intellectual development, however, had been impaired by
the assumption that the IQ determination of Gottsegen had been correct. This
assumption led his family and others to fail to provide him with the stimulation
that they otherwise would have given the child. Having been labeled as retard-
ed, Daniel was subsequently treated as retarded for twelve years. As a result,
Daniel felt that he was "substantially without an education; that he did not
12 Id. at 104.
13 Id.
14 Id. During those eleven years, although he continued to reside at the same address, Daniel was
transferred among five different schools.
15 Id. at 103.
16 Id. at 104.
17 Id. at 101.
18 The account of his subsequent actions is related at 410 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
19 Id. at 105. Dr. Kaplan added: "If * * * [one] is treated as a mentally retarded patient, a person who
cannot learn or cannot do something that normal children are doing, he assumes in the long run that that's
the role that he should be playing in life, and so this diminishes his incentive and diminishes the capacity to
learn." Id.
20 Id. at 106.
21 Brief for respondent, supra note 4, at 13.
22 410 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
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know what he could do to earn a living; and that he did not know where he fit-
ted into the world, and even where he fitted into his family." '23
The next few years showed little improvement in Daniel's condition.2 4 At
the time of trial, Daniel, age twenty-three, worked as a part-time messenger,
earning fifty dollars per week. 25
At trial, Daniel Hoffman was awarded a judgment of $750,000.26 The in-
termediate appellate court affirmed, although the judgment was reduced to
$500,000.27 The New York Court of Appeals, however, reversed and dismissed
the complaint as failing to state a cause of action.28 In dismissing the com-
plaint, the New York Court of Appeals labeled the facts in Hoff an as present-
ing a claim sounding in "educational malpractice," thus presenting no
recognized claim for relief. Because the significance of this decision lies in the
court's use of the term "educational malpractice" to describe the facts, it is
necessary to review the traditional type of educational malpractice action
before the impact of Hoffnan may be effectively evaluated.
III. History
Other than Hoffinan, there are only two significant cases in the educational
malpractice area. 29 The first and most often cited case is Peter W. v. San Fran-
cisco Unified School District.30 The second case is the very recent Donohue v.
Copiague Union Free School District.3 1 Both of these cases involve substantially the
same facts and issue,3 2 and share an identical result.3 3 Upon close examination
of these cases, however, it is apparent that the holdings are very specific, and
that the term educational malpractice is a term of art intended to cover a very
specific type of factual situation.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 100.
27 Id. at 111.
28 424 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
29 In Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878-79 (App. Div. 1978),
the court makes mention of two cases: Beaman v. Des Moines Area Community College, No. Cl. 15-8532
(5thJud. Dis. Iowa March 23, 1977) and Garrett v. School Board of Broward County, No. 77-8703 (17th
Jud. Cir. Fla. December 5, 1977). In Note, The ABC's of Duty: Educational Malpractice and the Functionally Il-
literate Student, 8 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 293, 295 (1978), the author mentions the case of Fisher v.
Washington, No. 833920 (Super. Ct. King Co., Wash., August 31, 1977).
The Garrett case was dismissed without opinion December 5, 1977. The Beaman case was dismissed
January 31, 1978, also without opinion. The Fisher case was settled, the case being dismissed by agreement
July 10, 1979.
30 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App. 1976) [hereinafter referred to as Peter W.]. The case was formerly titled
Doe v. San Francisco Unified School District, and is the subject of Saretsky, The Strangely Significant Case of
Peter Doe, 54 PHi DELTA KAPPAN 589 (1975) and Comment, Schools and School Districts, Doe v. San Francisco
Unified School District, 6 Loy. Cm. L. J. 462 (1974).
31 The case is reported at three levels: 408 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1977); 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (App. Div.
1978); 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. 1979). The intermediate appellate decision is the subject of commentary. See
Comment, Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District: New York Chooses Not to Recognize "Educational
Malpractice, " 43 ALa. L. REv. 339 (1979).
32 In the initial Donohue decision, Justice Baisley called the complaint in Donohue "parallel if not iden-
tical" to the complaint in Peter W. 408 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
33 That is, a person who claims to have been inadequately educated while a student in a public school
system may not state a cause of action in tort against the public authorities who operate and administer the
system. 131 Cal. Rptr. at 855; 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
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A. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District
In Peter W., the plaintiff challenged the effectiveness of the San Francisco
public school system.3 4 Eighteen-year-old Peter W. had graduated from high
school after twelve years of schooling. Intelligence testshad shown that he had
an average to slightly above average IQ and was completely able to be
educated. Peter W., however, was functionally illiterate. After twelve years of
schooling and the receipt of a high school diploma, he had the reading, writing,
and mathematical skill levels of a fifth-grader.
In his complaint, Peter W. claimed that he had been inadequately
educated, alleging that this was caused by negligence 35 of the defendant school
district. He further alleged that as a result of this failure to educate, he had suf-
fered a loss of earning capacity because he was unqualified for any employment
other than labor which required little or no ability to read and write.36 Peter W.
sought $500,000 in damages for lost wages due to his restricted occupational
opportunities and additional damages in compensation for the cost of a private
tutor.
The defendant school district demurred to the complaint. The trial court
sustained the demurrer, but granted Peter W. leave to amend. When he failed
to amend his complaint, the trial court entered judgment and dismissed the ac-
tion. From the dismissal, Peter W. appealed.
The appellate court, after noting that the doctrine of governmental im-
munity from tort liability had been abolished in California, set out the allega-
tions required by California law to plead sufficiently a cause of action for
negligence: "1) facts showing a duty of care in the defendant, 2) negligence
constituting a breach of the duty, and 3) injury to the plaintiff as a proximate
result. 37 Because the litigants were not contesting the elements of negligence,
proximate cause, or injury, the court focused its analysis entirely upon the re-
quirement of a duty of care in the defendant. The issue, characterized by the
court as "novel and troublesome," 3 8 was whether there was a duty to educate,
the failure of which could render school authorities liable for damages.
The court began its analysis by observing that although the defendant
school district did have a duty to educate with care within the common mean-
ing of the terms, its conduct must be viewed in light of duty of care construed in
34 This factual narrative is based upon the appellate court decision, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856. It is sup-
plemented by Comment, supra note 30.
35 This note examines only the negligence theory of recovery since this is the essence of the cause of ac-
tion labeled "educational malpractice." Other theories of recovery have been advanced. See generally Di-
mond, The Constitutional Right to Education: The Quiet Revolution, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 1087 (1973); Lipsig, Educa-
tional Malpractice-Recovery Theories Needed, 181-No. 125 N.Y.L.J. 1 (June 28, 1979); Note, Can a Student Sue
the School for Educational Malpractice?, 44 HARV. EDUC. REv. 4 (1974); Note, Educational Malfeasance: A New
Cause of Action For Failure to Educate?, 14 TuLSA L.J. 383 (1978); Note, The Right to Education: A Constitutional
Analysis, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 796 (1975); Comment, Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?, 7 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 117 (1978); Comment, Educational Malpractice, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (1976); Baratz and
Hartle, Malpractice in the Schools, PROoRESStVE, June, 1977 at 33-34; Suing the Teacher, NEWSWEEK, October 3,
1977 at 101.
36 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
37 Id. at 857.
38 Id. at 855.
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the legal sense. In this sense, the finding of a duty of care "amount[ed] to a
statement that two parties [stood] in such relationship that the law will impose
on one a responsibility for the exercise of care toward the other. "39
The appellate court noted that the legal abstraction, duty of care, em-
bodied three concepts. First, the existence of a duty of care was an essential fac-
tor in any assessment of liability for negligence. Second, whether such a duty
existed in a given factual situation was a question of law to be determined sole-
ly by the court. Third, and the concept most important to the present case, was
that judicial recognition of a duty of care in the defendant, with the conse-
quences of his liability in negligence for its breach, was initially to be dictated
or precluded by considerations of public policy. 40
For assistance in analyzing these amorphous "considerations of public
policy," the appellate court looked to the California Supreme Court. In
Rowland v. Christian, 41 that court had declared that the basis for all negligence
liability in California rested in section 1714 of the California Civil Code which
(paraphrased in terms of duty of care) states that "[a]ll persons are required to
use ordinary care to prevent others being injured as a result of their
conduct.' '42 Liability was to flow from this general principle in all cases except
when a departure from it was "clearly supported by public policy. ' 43 As a
result of this departure, although a person may have injured someone as a
result of his conduct, he will not be held liable if consideration of factors of
public policy dictate nonliability.
The court deemed the pertinent factors of public policy to be the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's con-
duct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's con-
duct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with the resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 44
The appellate court recognized the existence of additional factors as well.
Often classified as administrative or socio-economic considerations, these fac-
tors included the probability of feigned claims, the difficulty of proof of a par-
ticular injury, and the prospect of limitless liability for the same injury. 45 The
court stated that these policy considerations were "controlling" 46 in the deter-
mination of whether a defendant owed a legal duty of care.
After analysis of these policy considerations, the appellate court held that
39 Id. at 859 (quoting Raymond v. Paradise Unified School District, 218 Cal. App. 2d (1963)). Stated
another way "[Duty] ... is an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the
law to say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to relief." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS,
§53, at 325-26 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as PROSSER].
40 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
41 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
42 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859. CAL. CIVIL CODE §1714 (West), in pertinent part, reads: "Everyone is respon-
sible, not only for the result of his wilful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of or-
dinary care or skill in the management of his property or person .... 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859 n.2.
43 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859. See also PROSSER §4.
44 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60.
45 Id. at 860. See also PROSSER §4, at 21-23.
46 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
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the defendant school district did not owe Peter W. the requisite legal duty of
care, and, thus, plaintiff was not entitled to relief.
The court found the injury alleged by Peter W. to be simply not "com-
prehensible and assessable within the existing judicial framework.' ' 4 7 In the
words of the court:
Unlike the activity of the highway or market place, classroom methodology af-
fords no readily acceptable standards of care, or cause, or injury. The science
of pedagogy itself is fraught with different and conflicting theories of how or
what a child should be taught .... The "injury" claimed here is plaintiff's in-
ability to read and write. Substantial professional authority attests that the
achievement of literacy in the schools, or its failure, is influenced by a host of
factors which affect the pupil subjectively, from outside the formal teaching
process, and beyond the control of its ministers. They may be physical,
neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental; they may be present but not
perceived, recognized but not identified. 48
The court also found no conceivable "workability of a rule of care"
against which the school district's alleged conduct could be measured, no
reasonable "degree of certainly" that plaintiff suffered injury within the
meaning of the law of negligence, and no "perceptible connection" between
the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered which would establish a causal
link between them. 49
The court believed that these policy determinations alone would be
dispositive of the question of whether a duty of care was owed by the people
who administered the academic phases of the public educational system. The
court, however, discussed another factor, a practical consideration which
weighed heavily in its ultimate determination. Recognizing that the public
school systems of this country are under almost constant criticism and are
"beset by social and financial problems which have gone to major litigation," 50
the court was not willing to expose a school system to the "tort claims-real or
imagined-of disaffected students in countless numbers" 5 1 by holding them to
an actionable duty of care in the discharge of their academic functions. Realiz-
ing the constraints placed upon public schools by their publicly supported
budgets, the court stated that "the ultimate consequences [of recognizing an
actionable duty of care], in terms of public time and money, would burden [the
schools]-and society-beyond calculation." '5 2
The final result: public policy required that the school district not be held
liable for the injury allegedly suffered by Peter W. The appellate court affirmed
the dismissal of his complaint.
The scope of the holding in Peter W. is limited. In fact, the exact holding is
47 Id.
48 Id. at 860-61 (citing R. FLESCH, WHY JOHNNY CAN'T READ (1965) R. GAGNE, THE CONDITIONS OF
LEARNING (1965); SCHUBERT AND TORGERSON, IMPROVING THE READING PROGRAM (1968)). See also Stull, Why
Johnny Can't Read-His Own Diploma, 10 PAC. L. J. 647 (1979); Shanker, Dangers in the "Educational Malprac-
tice" Concept, AMERICAN TEACHER 4 (June 1975).
49 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
50 Id.
51 Id. But see PROSSER §12, at 51. "It is the business ofthe law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at
the expense of a 'flood of litigation,' and it is apitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court ofjustice
to deny relief on such grounds." (Emphasis added.)
52 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
[June 1980]
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expressed clearly in the opening lines of the majority opinion, "The... ques-
tion on this appeal is whether a person who claims to have been inadequately
educated, while a student in a public school system, may state a cause of action
in tort against the public authorities who operate and administer the system.
We hold that he may not." 53
The issue presented was narrow, and the holding was precise. A
reasonable construction of the opinion would limit the holding to the situation
where a student, under a general allegation of negligence, sought to recover
damages from the people who administered the academic phases of public
education for failing to provide him with adequate training in basic academic
skills.5 4
B. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District
In Donohue, 55 the New York courts were confronted with the same factual
situation as Peter W. 56 Donohue had been a student at a high school in the
defendant school district. In spite of the fact that he had received failing grades
in several subjects and lacked basic reading and writing skills, he was allowed
to graduate. After graduation, he found it necessary to employ a private tutor
in order to obtain the basic skills he had not acquired in high school.
Because of these alleged deficiencies in his knowledge, Donohue sued his
school district for $5,000,000. Like the plaintiff in Peter W., he sought recovery
on a negligence theory. 57 Donohue alleged that the school district had a duty to
teach him and to "test him ... in order to evaluate his ability to comprehend
the subject matters of the various courses" so that he would have a "sufficient
understanding and comprehension of subject matters in said courses as to...
qualify for a Certificate of Graduation.' '58 He claimed that since he was, in
fact, functionally illiterate upon graduation, the school district had breached
this duty in that they:
failed to evaluate the plaintiffs mental ability and capacity to comprehend the
subjects being taught to him at. said school; * * * failed to provide adequate
school facilities, teachers, administrators, psychologists, and other personnel
trained to take the necessary steps in testing and evaluation processes insofar
as the plaintiff is concerned in order to ascertain the learning capacity, in-
telligence and intellectual absorption on the part of the plaintiff; . . .failed to
teach plaintiff in such a manner so that he could reasonably understand what
was necessary under the circumstances so that he could cope with the various
subjects which they tried to make the plaintiff understand; * * * failed to adopt
the accepted professional standards and methods to evaluate and cope with
plaintiffs problems which constituted educational malpractice. 59
53 Id. at 855.
54 Id. at 856.
55 The case is reported at three levels; 408 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1977); 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (App. Div.
1978); 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. 1979).
56 This factual narrative is based upon the majority opinion of the intermediate appellate court, 407
N.Y.S.2d at 876-77.
57 Donohue also sought recovery for an alleged breach of a statutory duty imposed by Art. II S 1 of the
New York State Constitution. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877. This theory also failed.
58 407 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
59 Id. at 876-77.
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The defendant school district moved to dismiss the complaint for failing to
state a cause of action. Relying on the "persuasive reasoning" of the Califor-
nia court in Peter W., the New York State Supreme Court dismissed the com-
plaint.6 0
In light of the almost identical fact pattern presented in Donohue, it is not
surprising that the intermediate New York appellate court opinion mirrors the
California ruling in Peter W. The court began by reviewing the elements of a
negligence action in New York, stating that it was "axiomatic" that there can
be no recovery in negligence unless "1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a
cognizable duty of care, 2) the defendant failed to discharge that duty and 3)
the plaintiff suffered damage as a result of such failure.' '61
Noting that the question of duty was a question of law entirely for the
courts, 62 the court stated that the existence of a duty of care ultimately rested
upon principles of sound public policy. 63 This determination, of necessity, re-
quired consideration of many factors, which included,
moral considerations arising from the view of society toward the relationship of
the parties, the degree to which the courts should be involved in the regulation
of that relationship and the social utility of the activity out of which the alleged
injury arises; preventative considerations, which involve the ability of the defen-
dant to adopt practical means of preventing injury, the possibility that
reasonable men can agree as to the proper course to be followed to prevent in-
jury, the degree of certainly that the alleged injuries were proximately caused
by the defendant and the foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff; economic
considerations, which include the ability of the defendant to respond in
damages; and administrative considerations, which concern the ability of the
courts to cope with a flood of new litigation, the probability of feigned claims
and the difficulties inherent in proving the plaintiff's case. 6"
Recognizing that the question whether there was a duty to educate was
one of first impression in its jurisdiction, the court relied heavily on the analysis
of Peter W. The court quoted at length from the Peter W. opinion, and adopted
its rationale and conclusion.6 5 After examining the relevant factors of public
policy involved in the determination of a duty of care, 66 the court ruled that
there was no duty to educate flowing from educators to their students, the
breach of which would render them liable in damages.6 7
Although it seemed to base its holding upon the policy determinations of
Peter W., the intermediate appellate court mentioned an additional reason for
its reluctance to allow this cause of action to succeed. The majority believed
that the courts were simply not the appropriate place to "evaluate conflicting
theories of how best to educate." 68 Allowing plaintiffs like Donohue to succeed
would necessarily require judges and juries to determine which subjects should
60 408 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585 (Sup. Ct. 1977)
61 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877 (citing 41 N.Y. Jug., NEGLTIENCE §7).
62 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877 (citing to PROSSER §37, at 206).
63 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 878. This page is primarily a quote from Peter W.
66 The court never actually examines the factors listed at note 64 and accompanying text supra, in its
opinion. The court appears to simply adopt the policy determinations made in Peter W.
67 407 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
68 Id. at 879.
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be taught, which teaching methods should be utilized, which tests should be
administered, etc. Essentially, "recognition of a cause of action in negligence
to recover for 'educational malpractice' would impermissibly require the courts
to oversee the administration of the State's public school system.' '69 For these
reasons, Donohue's complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action.
The majority, however, made it clear that their determination should not
be viewed as sanctioning shoddy professionalism in teachers. In the words of
the court, "This determination does not mean that educators are not ethically
and legally responsible for providing a meaningful public education for the
youth of our State. Quite the contrary, all teachers and other officials of our
schools bear an important public trust and may be held to answer for the failure
to faithfully perform their duties. It does mean, however, that they may not be
sued for damages by an individual student for an alleged failure to reach cer-
tain educational objectives.''70
Justice Suozzi dissented. Drawing an analogy that the negligence alleged
was "not unlike that of a doctor who, although confronted with a patient with a
cancerous condition, fails to pursue medically accepted procedures to 1)
diagnose the specific condition and 2) treat the condition, and instead allows
the patient to suffer the inevitable consequences of the disease,' '71 he believed
the complaint was at least sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.
He also stated that the policy determinations of Peter W. relied upon by the
majority did not mandate a dismissal. The question of whether the functional
illiteracy of the plaintiff was caused by the negligence of the school district or
"was the product of forces outside the teaching process [was] really a question
of proof to be resolved at trial."172 He referred to the fear of a new flood of
litigation and the possible difficulty in framing a measure of damages as
"unpersuasive grounds for dismiss[al]" because "[flear of excessive litigation
caused by the creation of a new zone of liability was effectively refuted by the
abolition of sovereign immunity many years ago, and numerous environ-
mental actions fill our courts where damages are difficult to assess.' 73 He also
believed that the plaintiff had shown the existence of a statutory duty of care
flowing from defendant to him under former section 4404 of the New York
State Education Law. 74
Justice Suozzi simply found no difference between educational malprac-
tice and the other forms of malpractice and negligence actions recognized by
the courts. He warned that dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint without allow-
ing him his day in court was tantamount to sanctioning misfeasance in the
educational system. 75
In a terse opinion, 76 the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. The court
noted that no one in good faith could deny that a functionally illiterate high
69 Id.
70 407 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
71 Id. at 884.
72 Id. at 883.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 884.
75 Id.
76 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
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school graduate had not, in some fashion, been "injured. '"' 7 They also found
that the establishment of a standard by which to judge an educator's perfor-
mance was not necessarily an "insurmountable obstacle.''78 Moreover, the
court stated that nothing in the law prevented charging professional educators
with the same duty to the public as that owed by doctors, lawyers, architects,
engineers, and other professionals.7 9 The fact that a complaint may state a
valid cause of action under traditional tort law, however, does not require that
it be sustained. The court held that as a matter of public policy, claims of
educational malpractice should not be entertained by the courts.8 0
The New York Court of Appeals did not analyze the public policy con-
siderations in its opinion. It did, however, voice a concern expressed by- the
lower appellate court (adopting an attitude that would ultimately control in
Hoffinan)81 in even stronger language: "Recognition of this cause of action
would constitute blatant interference with the responsibility for the administra-
tion of the public school system lodged by Constitution and statute in school
administrative agencies." '8 2
The court used the phrase "this cause of action." Ostensibly, the court
was being specific and was limiting its holding to the situation when a cause of
action for educational malpractice is alleged. In light of the virtual identity of
the factual situations presented in Peter W. and Donohue, and in the face of the
heavy reliance on Peter W. by the Donohue courts, it would seem that the term
educational malpractice as used in Donohue mirrors the definition embraced in
Peter W. Specifically, the term educational malpractice is a term of art confined
to the question of whether a student, who claims to have been inadequately
educated in a public school system, may state a cause of action in tort against
the public authorities who operated and administered the system. 83 Peter W.
and Donohue have answered this question in the specific context of a student
whose only claim is for alleged inadequate training in basic academic
skills-public policy dictates that such a cause of action not be recognized by
the courts.
IV. Distinguishing Hoffiman
Even a cursory look at the cases of Peter W. and Donohue shows the basic
similarities between the two. The gist of Peter W.'s complaint was that his
school district had a duty to educate him, and that they had "failed to provide
plaintiff with adequate instruction, guidance, counseling, and/or supervision
in basic academic skills such as reading and writing" because of which he "suf-
fered a loss of earning capacity by his limited ability to read and write." 8 4
77 Id. at 378.
78 Id. at 377.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 378. Judge Wachtler points out that "It is a basic principle that the law does not provide a
remedy for every injury." Id. at 379 (Wachtler, J., concurring). One commentator does not agree: "It is the
business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it . . . . [E]very man that is injured ought to have his
recompense." PROSSER 52, at 51.
81 See note 127 and accompanying text infra.
82 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
83 131 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
84 Id. at 856.
[June 1980]
[Vol. 55:814]
Donohue's complaint was essentially the same. He claimed that the school
had failed "to evaluate his ability to comprehend the subject matters of the
various courses" so that he did not have a "sufficient understanding of subject
matters . . . to qualify for a Certificate of Graduation." 85 Since he had
graduated, however, he concluded that he was entitled to damages for the defi-
ciencies in his knowledge.
These complaints have two common characteristics. First, the allegations
of negligence were very general. Neither Peter W. nor Donohue alleged a
specific act on the part of their respective school officials that could have caused
their injury. A specific cause simply did not exist.
The other common feature is that the injury complained of in both cases
was functional illiteracy. Both Peter W. and Donohue had received years of
education in normal classes in a public school system, and both had graduated
without being able to read and write and without a basic understanding in
other courses. As a result of this functional illiteracy, they both sued their
respective school districts claiming a general failure of an alleged duty to
educate.
In the end, the courts gave each case identical treatment. Out of this iden-
tical treatment evolved a label for the cause of action both Peter W. and
Donohue had presented- "educational malpractice." Both the California and
the New York courts were specific in their holdings. There was no indication in
the opinions that the term educational malpractice was meant to define
anything but the facts and allegations presented in- Peter W. and Donohue. As a
result of these decisions, therefore, a claim alleging educational malpractice
can be said to have the following characteristics: (1) a graduate who had en-
joyed an otherwise normal education, but despite that had (2) graduated as a
functional illiterate, and who now (3) seeks to recover damages in tort from his
school district for an alleged failure of its general duty to educate.
At the outset, the case presented by Daniel Hoffman seems distinct from
the cases presented by Peter W. and Donohue. Daniel Hoffman was not a
disgruntled student claiming that because he had graduated from high school
without being able to read and write he should be entitled to damages in tort.8 6
Rather, he claimed that he was the victim of professional negligence which
caused him to be erroneously classified and treated as mentally retarded for
twelve years of his life.
In his complaint, Daniel alleged an element that neither Peter W. nor
Donohue was able to allege. He was able to point to specific acts on the part of
the school authorities which ultimately resulted in his injury. Daniel
Hoffman's complaint alleged two acts of negligence "1) the defendant was
negligent in its original testing procedures and placement of the plaintiff in an
educational environment for mental defectives . . . and 2) the defendant was
negligent in failing or refusing to follow adequate procedures for the recom-
mended retesting of plaintiffs IQ."87 These specific acts, the original testing
by Gottsegen, the placement of Daniel in CRMD classes upon a borderline
85 407 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
86 Daniel had never graduated from any school, and there is some record that he could read and write.
410 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
87 410 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
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determination of IQ and the subsequent failure of the school authorities to
retest as Gottsegen had recommended, are readily seen as the cause of Daniel's
injury. Because of these specific acts, a boy of normal intelligence was classified
and treated as mentally handicapped for twelve years.
The nature of Daniel's injury also differed substantially from the injuries
alleged by Peter W. and Donohue. Daniel did not seek recovery because of
functional illiteracy. His injury was the emotional trauma suffered from having
spent twelve years of his life unjustly "imprisoned in a world of disturbed,
disrupted [and] abnormal beings." 88 The normal world had shunned him, and
although he could not understand it, he was intelligent enough to perceive what
was happening to him. He eventually resigned himself to the role society had
dictated to him-the role of the retarded child. He developed "feelings of in-
adequacy" and a "defective self-image" 8 9 as a result. Then, suddenly, he was
told that he is normal, and that society now expected him to exist and survive
in the world of the normal. The shock of this revelation sent Daniel into a state
of prolonged depression. As one psychiatrist testified at trial, "when one is told
he is not retarded after 13 years of being considered otherwise, one cannot then
simply go out and say, 'Now I am not retarded. I am going to conquer the
world or do something.' "90 Arguably, Daniel suffered extended mental
anguish.
Thus, unlike Peter W. or Donohue, Daniel had never had a normal
education in any sense, he did not claim functional illiteracy as his injury, and
he could point to specific acts on the part of school authorities that resulted in
his harm. But even beyond the factual distinctions, the issue presented in Hoff-
man also varied from that in Peter W. and Donohue. As one author noted: "In
Hoffman . . . the thrust of the plaintiffs case is not so much a failure to take
steps to detect and correct a weakness in a student, that is, a failure to provide a
positive program for a student, but rather, affirmative acts of negligence which
imposed additional and crippling burdens upon a student. . . . [I]t does not
seem unreasonable to hold a school board liable for the type of behavior ex-
hibited in Hoff nan. 91
Despite all these discrepancies, however, the New York Court of Appeals
summarily classified Daniel Hoffman with Peter W. and Donohue, and
dismissed his complaint for stating an unrecognized claim of "educational
malpractice."
V. The Treatment of Hoffnan by the New York Courts
A. The Intermediate Appellate Court
In a three-to-two decision, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court on the condition that the respondent accept a re-
duced verdict of $500,000.92 Avoiding the allegation that Gottsegen had been
88 Brief for respondent, supra note 4, at 51.
89 410 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
90 Id.
91 Diamond, Education Law, 29 SYvAcusE L. REv. 103, 150-51; (1978);410 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
92 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sp. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
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negligent in the initial testing and recommendation for CRMD placement, the
majority focused upon the school officials' failure to follow the recommenda-
tion that Daniel's "intelligence be re-evaluated within a two-year period so
that a more accurate estimation of his abilities can be made. )29
The school board had argued that a reevaluation of intelligence was not
the same as a retesting of intelligence. Both terms were words of art. To
''retest" meant to administer an additional intelligence test, while to "re-
evaluate" meant observation of the child, using his classroom progress and
subsequent performance on semiannual achievement tests to determine
whether another intelligence test was warranted. The school board pointed out
that Daniel had been constantly observed in his CRMD classes, his progress
being noted and measured by semiannual achievement tests. In the opinion of
his teachers, they saw nothing that contradicted Gottsegen's initial determina-
tion of retardation. Consequently, administration of another intelligence test
did not appear necessary. 94
The majority was not impressed by the defendant's semantic distinction.
In the words of Justice Shapiro, the majority admonished the defendants, "So
little had to be done to avoid the awesome and devastating effect ... on plain-
tiffs life, and that little was not done." ' 95 The majority found that the defen-
dant's contention contradicted the testimony of its own expert witnesses that
the intelligence of children is determined solely by intelligence tests, not by
achievement tests and classroom evaluations. 96 They argued that if Gottsegen
had meant what defendant contended, and not that another intelligence test be
administered, then he had meant less than nothing. If what the defendant
claimed were true, it would mean that instead of observing Daniel daily, his
teachers would only have to note his progress once in the following two years, a
result the majority concluded was absurd. 97
The majority also pointed out that even if Gottsegen's initial recommen-
dation was puzzling or equivocal, it was up to the school administration to find
out what its own employee was talking about. In light of the borderline deter-
mination of IQ, the majority held that defendant's affirmative act of CRMD
placement created a relationship out of which a duty arose to take reasonable
steps to ascertain whether that placement was proper.98 Because the direction
for retesting was placed in the same document which directed the CRMD
placement, the majority called the failure to follow Gottsegen's recommenda-
tion "an egregious error committed on a wholesale basis.' 99 The court con-
cluded that the jury could properly have found that if Gottsegen's report was
ambiguous, each teacher was negligent in failing to inquire as to its true mean-
93 From Gottsegen's report after the administration of the January 9, 1957 intelligence test. Id. at 107.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 109.
96 Id. at 107. The court notes in a footnote that Dr. Donald Wiedis, a witness for the defendant,
testified that intelligence tests have nothing to do with what one has learned in the past and are not designed
"to tap academic achievement." Another witness for the defendant, Dr. Henry Lipton, testified that the
word "intelligence" would require an IQevaluation which could not be done without an IQtest. Id. at n.4.
97 Id. at 108.
98 Id. at 109.
99 Id. at 108.
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ing, and thus, the school district was equally responsible as their employer
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.00
After noting that in New York damages for psychological and emotional
injury are recoverable even absent physical injury, the court addressed itself to
the argument that the case presented an unrecognized claim of educational
malpractice. The court began with an analogy; if Daniel had been improperly
diagnosed or treated by medical or psychological personnel in a municipal
hospital, the municipality would have been liable for the resulting damage.' 0 '
"Negligence is negligence,' ' 0 2 and the majority found no reason to afford
special treatment simply because the governmental entity involved was a
school system. The court pointedly distinguished Peter W. and Donohue and the
policy reasons that previously had led to the denial of a cause of action for
"educational malpractice." In the words of the court:
[D]efendant's rhetoric constructs a chamber of horrors by asserting that affir-
mance in this case would create a new theory of liability known as "educa-
tional malpractice" and that before doing so we must consider public policy
and the effects of opening a vast new field which will further impoverish finan-
cially hard pressed municipalities. Defendant, in effect, suggests that to avoid
such horrors, educational entities must be insulated from the legal respon-
sibilities and obligations common to all other governmental entities no matter
how seriously a particular student may have been injured and, ironically, even
though such injuries were caused by their own affirmative acts in failing to
follow their own rules. 1 °0
I see no reason for such a trade-off, on alleged policy grounds, which
would warrant a denial of fair dealing to one who is injured by exempting a
governmental agency from its responsibility for its affirmative torts. * * * If the
door to "educational torts" for nonfeasance is to be opened, it will not be by
this case which involves misfeasance in failing to follow the individualized and
specific prescription of defendant's own certified psychologist, whose very
decision it was in the first place, to place plaintiff in a class for retarded
children .... 10
The majority concluded that a dismissal of the complaint would constitute
"an intrusion on the jury's role as trier of fact," and would be "an unwar-
ranted finding of fact in a jury case."'' 0 5 The majority affirmed, stating that
"any other result would be a reproach to justice," 0 6 and ending its opinion by
quoting the Latin maxim, "Fiat justitia, ruat coelum." 0 7
Two dissenting justices wrote separate opinions. Justice Martuscello felt
that the plaintiff had not established the negligence of the defendant by its
100 Id.
101 Id. at 110.
102 Id.
103 This refers to the failure of the school authorities to follow the recommendation of Gottsegen that
Daniel's intelligence be re-evaluated within two years.
104 410 N.Y.S.2d at 110 (citations deleted). By using this misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction, the ma-
jority really plays its own semantic game, as the dissent of Justice Damiani points out. The emotional and
colorful language of the majority opinion suggests that the majority had determined that Daniel should
recover, but had to grope for a theory to justify the affirmance.
105 Id. at 111.
106 Id.
107 Let justice be done, though the heavens fall.
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breach of a duty owed to him under either of his proposed theories of
liability. 108
Focusing on plaintiffs allegation that Gottsegen had been negligent in his
administration of the initial intelligence test, he noted that none of plaintiff's
expert witnesses had testified that Gottsegen had departed from good
psychological practice in administering a primarily verbal IQ test to a child
with a severe speech impediment.10 9 Although one expert had felt that it would
have been wise to supplement the verbal test with a nonverbal IQ test, the
court could not infer that he was unwise not to do it or that he had deviated
from standard psychological practice. 110 When inferences were equally consis-
tent, one with liability and the other without it, the plaintiff had simply not met
his burden of proof and the case should not have been allowed to go to the
jury.- l l
As to plaintiffs second theory, the one relied upon by the majority, Justice
Martuscello agreed with defendant's interpretation of the crucial word "re-
evaluate." He believed that plaintiff had, in fact, been periodically re-
evaluated. This reevaluation consisted of Daniel's entire school record, in-
cluding his teacher's observations in class and his results on the standardized
achievement tests.11 2 Accordingly, Justice Martuscello found no justification
for affirmance and suggested that the judgment be reversed and the complaint
be dismissed.
Justice Damiani, on the other hand, concluded the complaint should be
dismissed since the public policy of the state, as established in Donohue, man-
dated that a cause of action sounding in educational malpractice may not be
recognized. He believed that the majority's affirmance necessarily involved the
courts in the evaluation of the judgments and actions of educators, an in-
terference that Donohue expressly prohibits. 113
Justice Damiani also found fault with the majority's classification of
Daniel's problem as an injury. Daniel had suffered from a severe speech im-
pediment before he had entered the defendant's schools, and thus the failure to
teach him to speak properly left him no worse off than when he had entered the
school system. Since he was no worse off than when he started and his subse-
quent learning difficulties stemmed from his inability to communicate, Daniel
had not suffered an injury within the meaning of tort law.' ' 4
Justice Damiani further blamed plaintiff and his mother for not protesting
his placement in CRMD classes." 5 He noted that Daniel had received the best
speech therapy the school district had to offer and that he had been instructed
in social studies, mathematics, English, and science and that he did have the
ability to read and write." 6 He also reasoned that the benefit of retrospection
108 See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
109 410 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 117.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 118.
115 Id.
116 Id.
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had enabled the plaintiff to convince the jury that he had been severely dam-
aged by his erroneous placement. 117
Justice Damiani did, however, make a valid criticism of the majority's
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction that they had claimed separated Hoffinan
from Donohue. In his words,
Quite apart from the fact that the complaints in both [Donohue and "Hoffinan]
alleged acts of both omission and commission, the main thrust of the plaintiff's
case at bar was that the defendant failed to retest plaintiff within two years
after his placement in a CRMD class as recommended by its own
psychologist. This act of omission is one of nonfeasance, which is defined as
the failure to perform an act which a person should perform.... In Donohue,
the gist of the plaintiff's cause of action was that although the defendant had
given him instruction in reading, it had not done so properly or effectively and
therefore he could not read upon graduation. This was an act of commission
or misfeasance, which is defined as the improper performance of a lawful
act.'' 8
The majority had thus mislabeled the case before it as involving
misfeasance instead of nonfeasance. But even if the case had been correctly
classified, Justice Damiani felt that the distinction was immaterial. The real
question was whether defendant owed plaintiff a duty, not whether the breach
of the duty was by active or passive conduct. 1' 9 Stating that Donohue conclusive-
ly established that no such duty existed, he claimed that the failure of the ma-
jority to follow an obviously controlling precedent could lead only to uncertain-
ty in the law.' 20
B. The New York Court of Appeals
Hoffman reached the New York Court of Appeals shortly' 2' after the court
had rendered its decision in Donohue.122 In a surprisingly short opinion, the
New York Court of Appeals reversed in a four-to-three decision. The majority
ignored the obvious difference of the facts in Hoffmnan and, without explanation,
summarily labeled the case as presenting the identical issue as that presented in
Donohue and Peter W. -educational malpractice.
After a brief statement of the facts, the court began with the following:
"At the outset, it should be stated that although plaintiff's complaint does not
so state, his cause of action sounds in 'educational malpractice.' . . . As we
have recently stated in Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District, such a cause
of action although quite possibly cognizable under traditional notions of tort
law, should not, as a matter of public policy, be entertained by the courts of
this State.'' 1 23
117 Id.
118 Id. (citations deleted). For a further analysis of the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance,
see PROSSER 556; 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §18.6 (1956).
119 410 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
120 Id. at 119.
121 The final Donohue decision was rendered on June 13, 1979. The Hoffman decision was rendered on
December 17, 1979. In this respect, Daniel Hoffman can be viewed as a victim of bad timing.
122 See text accompanying note 55-83 supra.
123 424 N.Y.S.2d at 378-79 (citation deleted).
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Stating that "[t]he significant issue presented on this appeal is whether
considerations of public policy preclude recovery for an alleged failure to prop-
erly evaluate the intellectual capacity of a student,"1 24 the majority continued,
"We had thought it well settled that the courts of this State may not substitute
their judgment, or the judgment of a jury, for the professional judgment of
educators." 125
The court focused on the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction drawn by
the lower appellate court. "[E]ven if we were to accept the distinction drawn by
the court below, and argued by plaintiff on appeal, we would not reach a con-
trary result. The policy considerations which prompted our decision in Donohue
apply with equal force to 'educational malpractice' actions based upon allega-
tions of educational misfeasance and nonfeasance. 1 1 26
The court concluded its opinion by warning of a potential Pandora's box
of judicial interference in the administration of the public school system: "In
order to affirm a finding of liability in these circumstances, this court would be
required to allow the finder of fact to substitute its judgment for the profes-
sional judgment of the board of education. . . .Such a decision would also
allow a court or a jury to second-guess the determinations of each of plaintiffs
teachers. To do so would open the door to examination of the propriety of each
of the procedures used in the education of every student in our school
system."1 27
The dissent in the decision is similarly succinct, and goes to the point of
this Note. Justice Meyer, in dissent, wrote,
I agree with Mr. Justice Irwin Shapiro, on the analysis spelled out in his well-
reasoned decision at the Appellate Division, that this case involves not
"educational malpractice" as the majority in this court suggests, but discerni-
ble affirmative negligence on the part of the board of education in failing to
carry out the recommendation within a period of two years which was an in-
tegral part of the procedure by which plaintiff was placed in a CRMD class,
and thus readizy identifiable as the proximate cause of plaintiffs damages. I,
therefore, dissent. 128
VI. Implications of the Decision
In Hoffinan, the New York Court of Appeals held that courts ought not in-
terfere with the professional judgment of those charged with the responsibility
of administration of the public school system. Public policy dictated that causes
of action for educational malpractice not be recognized by the courts. It was the
summary classification of Hoffnan as presenting a claim of educational
malpractice that marks the potentially significant development in the area of
education law.
Prior to the Hoffman decision, educational malpractice had enjoyed a
specific meaning. It was a term of art used to describe the negligence claim
alleged by a student when he sued his school district for alleged inadequate in-
struction in basic academic skills. This was the fact situation presented in both
124 Id. at 377.
125 Id. at 379.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 380 (citations deleted).
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Peter W. and Donohue, the cases that gave rise to the term. By labeling the facts
presented in Hoffinan as presenting the identical case and issue as Peter W. and
Donohue, the court effectively redefined the term educational malpractice by
significantly expanding its scope. Educational malpractice appears to have
become a generic term, describing any plaintiff's questioning of public school
administrative decisions.
In light of the scant authority in the area of educational tort, what may
develop out of this decision is a judicially created immunity for school officials
in the discharge of their administrative and academic functions. If Daniel Hoff-
man was not able to recover, school authorities may be able to shield even the
most egregious examples of professional incompetence with its accompanying
emotional harm129 from judicial inquiry simply by raising the educational
malpractice banner.
Daniel Hoffman did not recover for his injury, and yet, there seems to be
no reason why he could not have recovered under basic negligence theory. It
has been said that a person is negligent if "he does such an act or omits to take
such a precaution that under the circumstances present he, as an ordinarily
prudent person, ought reasonably to foresee that he will thereby expose the in-
terests of another to an unreasonable risk of harm.' ' 130
Negligence thus involves conduct which exposes another to an
unreasonable risk of harm.13 ' What is an "unreasonable risk" was defined by
Judge Learned Hand as a consideration of the likelihood that the conduct will
injure others taken with the seriousness of the injury should it occur and
balanced against the interest that must be sacrificed to avoid the risk.13 2
Application of this balancing test to the Hoffman situation shows that an af-
firmance was entirely justifiable. At the very least, it was arguably foreseeable
that the erroneous placement of a child of normal intelligence into a class for
the mentally handicapped for twelve years would result in some type of emo-
tional damage. It was equally foreseeable that if care was not taken to insure
that the placement was proper, the extended period of time that the child would
spend classified as mentally retarded would serve only to substantially ag-
gravate the injury.
These determinations are then balanced against a practically insignificant
weight on the other side of the scale. The administration of a subsequent in-
telligence test as originally recommended, or the taking of a social history
would have been so simple that it could not be seriously argued as resulting in
the sacrifice of some great value or interest. Justice Shapiro's words again ring
true. "So little had to be done to avoid the awesome and devastating effect...
on plaintiff's life, and that little was not done." 3 3
The balancing test thus weighs heavily upon a finding of negligence, and
it is likely that had Daniel's injury arisen in some other setting, he would have
129 The liability of public school officials for the physical injury of a student is an entirely different area
of the law. For a general treatment of this area see Note, supra note 29, at 299-303.
130 Osborn v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 233, 242, 234 N.W. 372, 379 (1931) as quoted in 2 HARPER AND
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTs §16.9, at 929 (1956).
131 PROSSER §31, at 145.
132 Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940); See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS 5
291-95 (1965).
133 410 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
[June 1980]
[Vol. 55:814]
recovered. 134 The New York Court of Appeals afforded education special treat-
ment by noting that Donohue had established that the educational setting in-
volved public policy considerations that mandated a reversal in Hoffnan.135
The policy considerations of Donohue, 136 however, were not furthered by the
dismissal of the complaint in Hoffnan. The school district can, and indeed has,
adopted preventative measures that more or less guarantee that a Hoffnan-like
situation will not occur again. 137 The proximate cause of Daniel's injury can
also be traced to his erroneous placement and the subsequent failure to retest.
It is also difficult to perceive the same probability of the flood of litigation and
the great number of feigned claims arising from an affirmance of Hoffnan that
led the court to deny recovery in Donohue. The policy determinations behind
Donohue simply do not yield the identical result when applied to Hoffnan. The
reason for this is apparent. Daniel Hoffman did not present a claim of educa-
tional malpractice.
VII. Conclusion
Although Daniel Hoffman did present a unique factual situation to the
New York courts, he did not present a claim of educational malpractice. Daniel
Hoffman was a victim of professional negligence, but he was denied recovery
simply because his injury arose in an educational setting. This decision will un-
doubtedly shield many otherwise negligent people from liability because it ef-
fectively establishes an immunity for school officials in the exercise of their ad-
ministrative and academic duties. It is an inhumane decision, for liability has
been conditioned upon the context in which the injury arose, rather than upon
the merit of the individual claim.
Edward. Wallison, Jr.
134 Id. at 110.
135 424 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
136 See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
137 The intermediate appellate court in Hoffinan noted that since 1968, both New York State and the
New York City Board of Education have required frequent and periodic retesting of children in CRMD
classes. Seegenerally N.Y. EDUCATION LAW §§4402-4407 (McKinney).
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